Research findings on the relationship between climate and conflict are diverse and contested. Here we assess the current understanding of the relationship between climate and conflict, based on the structured judgments of experts from diverse disciplines. These experts agree that climate has affected organized armed conflict within countries. However, other drivers, such as low socioeconomic development and low capabilities of the state, are judged to be substantially more influential, and the mechanisms of climate-conflict linkages remain a key uncertainty. Intensifying climate change is estimated to increase future risks of conflict.
R esearch over the past decade has established that climate variability and climate change may influence the risk of violent conflict, including organized armed conflict 1, 2 . However, use of different research designs, datasets and methods has resulted in divergent findings and stark questions about legitimate approaches to scientific inference 1, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Previous analyses, many from authors of this paper, have both asserted and refuted a substantial role for climate in conflicts to date and have repeatedly triggered dissenting perspectives 1, [3] [4] [5] [6] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Even syntheses have failed to clarify areas of agreement and reasons for disagreement 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, [23] [24] [25] [26] . There are important uncertainties about when and how climate has caused conflict to date, and under future scenarios 8, 23, 27, 28 . The lack of clarity on current knowledge limits informed management of the risks of conflict to states and human security, and of the risks of continuing greenhouse gas emissions.
Expert elicitation is a well-vetted method for documenting the judgments of experts about available evidence 29 (Methods). For societally relevant topics with divergent evidence, experimental comparisons of structured elicitation and group-panel assessment have suggested that individual elicitation paired with collective assessment can better reveal the state of knowledge than either approach in isolation [30] [31] [32] . Here, we develop a synoptic assessment of the relationship between climate and conflict.
The assessment approach and expert group
Our focus is organized armed conflict within countries (Extended Data Fig. 1 ). Previous crosscutting analyses of climate and conflict have combined individual-level violence (for example, suicide or domestic violence) through to war between countries 2, 4, 9 . However, drivers of suicide fundamentally differ from drivers of world wars. To enable a focused evaluation, the social scale of violence is constrained to organized armed conflict within countries (that is, state-based armed conflict, non-state armed conflict and one-sided violence against civilians) 33 . These forms of violent conflict may affect or be affected by conflict in neighbouring areas or external intervention. In evaluating the effects of climate, climate-related variability, hazards, trends and change are all included (for example, related to temperature, precipitation, modes of variability, such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation, and extreme events, such as droughts and floods).
The authors of this manuscript consist of 3 assessment facilitators and a group of 11 climate and conflict experts. The group of 11 experts is a sample of the most experienced and highly cited scholars on the topic, spanning relevant social science disciplines (especially political science, economics, geography and environmental sciences), epistemological approaches and diverse previous conclusions about climate and conflict (Methods). The selection of the expert group was done based on expertise necessary to resolve scientific disagreement about the contribution of climate to conflict risks globally and in conflict-prone regions, which requires consideration of comparative and crosscutting analyses and replicable empirical research. For climate and conflict overall, however, the scope of relevant expertise in scholarship, practice and policy is vast. Semi-structured interviews with purposively sampled stakeholders were used to inform the project.
The expert group participated in 6-8-h individual expert-elicitation interviews and a subsequent 2-day group deliberation (Methods). The interview and deliberation protocols were collectively developed by the authors and then administered by the assessment facilitators. In total, 950 transcript pages from the interviews and deliberation were iteratively analysed and distilled. The results presented here include subjective probabilistic judgments documented individually (Extended Data Figs. 2-4 ) and the origins of these judgments in the scientific literature (Supplementary Information). The approach establishes a foundation for assessing-across the full academic field-the strengths and limitations of our current understanding and the reasons for disagreement.
This assessment approach complements existing crosscutting reviews, meta-analyses and perspectives on climate and conflict 2, 8, 9, 17, 23, [25] [26] [27] . The methods here go beyond previous syntheses by (1) systematically characterizing judgments not only about well-quantified risks, but also more uncertain outcomes that may carry large consequences; (2) thoroughly exploring how these judgments are underpinned by present-day knowledge; and (3) rigorously combining individual and collective deliberations to minimize biases.
The climate-conflict relationship
The experts agree that, over the past century, climate variability, hazards and trends have affected organized armed conflict within countries (Figs. 1, 2) . They also agree that other conflict drivers are much more influential for conflict risk across experiences to date, as compared to climate variability and change (Fig. 3) .
Estimates of conflict risk related to climate to date overlap across experts (Fig. 1) . Across the experts, best estimates are that 3-20% of conflict risk over the past century has been influenced by climate variability or change, and none of their individual estimated ranges excludes a role of climate in 10% of conflict risk to date. Throughout this assessment, risk is defined as the potential for consequences in cases in which something of value is at stake, which can be represented as probability multiplied by consequences 34 . Under this definition, an influence of climate on conflict risk can involve a change in the likelihood of conflict occurring (for example, the frequency of conflict outbreaks or the duration of a conflict) or altered magnitudes of the resulting harmful consequences (for example, number of deaths, destruction of assets or legacies of violence). The definition allows for consideration of the initial outbreak and continuing incidences of violent conflict, and the consequences of these conflicts 34 . When evaluating conflict drivers to date, each expert individually ranked causal factors that have most influenced the risk of conflict over the past century, drawing from a list of 16 factors that were collectively generated by the expert group (Fig. 3a) . Each expert also ranked factors on the basis of how much uncertainty there was about their influence 35 ( Fig. 3a) .
Across experts, four drivers were ranked as particularly influential for conflict risk to date: low socioeconomic development, low capabilities of the state, intergroup inequality (for example, ethnic differences across groups) and recent history of violent conflict (Fig. 3a) . The experts indicate that there is more uncertainty about the influence of low socioeconomic development and recent history of conflict, compared to low capabilities of the state and intergroup inequality. There is high agreement that low socioeconomic development is one of the strongest predictors of the onset of intrastate conflict and its continuing incidence 36 . However, there is uncertainty about whether it is a proxy for other mechanisms or whether it is directly related to conflict risk, especially because fewer livelihood opportunities can increase the ease of mobilizing rebels (Supplementary Table 1 ). Similarly, recent history of violent conflict is a strong predictor of subsequent conflicts 36 . However, there is uncertainty that stems from the many possible causal mechanisms, including more individuals with knowledge and weapons to fight, persistent factors that contribute to instability or the continuation of grievances from previous violence.
Climate variability and/or change is low on the ranked list of the most influential conflict drivers across experiences to date, and the experts rank it as the most uncertain in its influence (Fig. 3a , Extended Data Tables 1, 2 and Supplementary Table 2 ). This judgment of uncertainty is perhaps unsurprising given the divergent research findings to date, which have motivated this expert assessment 1, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 9 . Within a risk framing, such uncertainty is important to assess when outcomes have low or difficult-to-quantify probabilities, but may carry large consequences that are relevant to ongoing decision-making processes 31, 34, 37 . The experts agree that additional climate change will amplify conflict risk, along with the associated uncertainties (Fig. 2) . Climate variability and change are estimated to have substantially increased risk across 5% of conflicts to date (mean estimate across experts). By contrast, an approximately 2 °C increase in the global mean temperature above preindustrial levels is estimated to substantially increase conflict risk with 13% probability, rising to 26% probability under an approximately 4 °C warming scenario. A 'substantial' increase in conflict risk was defined in the elicitation as involving severe and widespread effects, based on criteria for key risks that have been developed and applied in assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 34 . The judgments about increasing conflict risk in the 2 °C and 4 °C warming scenarios incorporate a hypothetical constraint that assumes societies with the current levels of socioeconomic development experience additional climate change. Even with this constraint, uncertainties increase notably. The range of estimates from individual experts for a substantial increase in conflict risk due to climate increases from a probability of 0-15% for conflicts to date to a probability of 10-50% in the 4 °C scenario (Fig. 2) .
Climate-conflict linkages
Across experts, there is low confidence in the mechanisms through which climate affects the risk of conflict (Fig. 3 and Extended Data Tables 1, 2 ). For each conflict driver across experiences to date, each expert estimated the frequency with which climate variability and change increased or decreased conflict risk through the driver or had negligible effect ( Fig. 3 and Extended Data Figs. 5, 6). For the four conflict drivers that were ranked to be the most influential overall, the experts estimate that the climatic sensitivity of these drivers is relatively low (low socioeconomic development, low capabilities of the state, intergroup inequality and recent history of conflict) (Fig. 3b) . Notably, non-climate factors and historical processes shape these conflict drivers (Extended Data Table 1 ). However, where climate has affected conflict risk through these top-four conflict drivers, the experts estimate that climate has most often increased, rather than decreased, the risk of conflict (Fig. 3c) . By contrast, the causal factors that are judged to be most sensitive to climate are ranked as much less influential to the risk of conflict overall. In particular, economic shocks and dependency on natural resources are judged to be likely climate-conflict linkages across experiences to date (Fig. 3b) ; however, their overall influence on conflict risk is much lower (Fig. 3a) . Furthermore, the experts estimate that climate has had more variable and uncertain effects in both increasing and decreasing the risk of conflict through these linkages (Fig. 3c) .
Climate-related hazards, variability and change can cause economic shocks through effects on agricultural productivity or food prices, or through the direct and indirect consequences of disasters such as floods, droughts, heat waves or cyclones (Extended Data Table 2 ). Such shocks could heighten conflict risks through several potential mechanisms, including reduced opportunity costs for violence (in which adverse effects on livelihoods make participation in violence relatively more attractive), uneven economic effects precipitating the collapse of intergroup bargains or deleterious effects on long-term socioeconomic development. The consequences of climate-related economic shocks are highly variable and depend on the affected areas and timing (for example, growing-season drought in rain-fed versus irrigated croplands), affected sectors and groups (for example, exports that affect state capability and/or employment), and political will and response capacity (for example, availability of cash transfers or alternative livelihoods).
Linkages through dependency on natural resources also underscore uncertainty due to context-specific and multifaceted interactions (Extended Data Table 2 ). Climate-related resource scarcity can increase conflict risk; however, it can also stimulate cooperation to ensure the fair distribution of resources, or decrease conflict risk if more time is spent on procuring food or because conditions are unfavourable for sustaining an armed group 38, 39 . Climate-related resource abundance can also have conditional and complex effects if there are higher opportunity costs for violence or improved conditions for mounting and sustaining conflict.
In the future, climate change could increase the risk of conflict through channels beyond the climate-variability effects that have been important to date (Extended Data Table 2 ). Because such linkages exceed historical experiences, uncertainties increase especially under large magnitudes of climate change, such as an increase in global mean temperature of 4 °C (Fig. 2) . Extrapolation from historical relationships has high levels of uncertainty because complex climate-conflict linkages partly depend on future socioeconomic development pathways, macroeconomic patterns (for example, global recession), shifts in state capability, ideological fluctuations and the state of global order and cooperation (for example, through the UN (United Nations) Security Council).
Future climate-conflict linkages could involve exacerbation of climate-conflict connections that are present in experiences to date, climate change effects that are fundamentally beyond previous experiences or circumstances in which existing response capacities reach their limits. Across these categories, relevant climate change risks include substantial economic effects, climatic extremes and associated disasters, effects on agricultural production or differential climate change effects that increase intergroup inequalities (Extended Data Table 2 ). Such influences could also reveal 'missing' institutions, for which governance mechanisms do not yet exist to address emergent climate change risks (for example, the potential for substantial increases in migration).
The potential for risk reduction
The experts agree that conflict risk related to climate can be reduced with substantial investments in the reduction of the risk of conflict (Extended Data Fig. 7 and Extended Data Table 3 ). For conflicts to Aggregated weighted rankings of the causal factors are indicated: a factor ranked first in the listing of an expert is assigned a value of 6, through to a value of 1 for a factor ranked sixth. b, c, The relationship between factors that drive conflict risk (from a) and climate in experiences to date. Two measures are shown: climate sensitivity (b) and the increase/decrease ratio (c). For conflicts to date in which each causal factor is relevant, climate sensitivity is the estimated fraction of these conflicts for which climate has affected conflict risk, increasing or decreasing it. Of this, the increase/decrease ratio is the fraction allocated to increased conflict risk.
For climate sensitivity, a higher value indicates that climate variability and change have more frequently modulated conflict risk through the factor. For the increase/decrease ratio, a value of 1 indicates climate sensitivity was estimated to only increase conflict risk, whereas a value of 0.5 indicates climate sensitivity equally increases and decreases conflict risk. date, the experts estimate with a 67% probability that climate-related conflict risk could be reduced through investments that address known drivers (mean estimates across experts). For a 4 °C scenario, however, the estimated potential for reducing climate-related conflict risk drops to a 57% probability, given more severe climate change effects. The potential for synergies exists between the reduction in conflict risk and adaptation to climate change (Extended Data Table 3 ). Similar factors determine vulnerability to both climate change and armed conflict. Specific measures that address these factors can ameliorate climate-conflict linkages and advance sustainable development and human security, interlinked with the quality of governance, the persistence of structural inequities and capacity across levels of government. Relevant adaptation options (for example, crop insurance, training services, cash transfers, improved storage after harvest or more-secure land tenure) can support food and livelihood security and economic diversification beyond agricultural livelihoods. Furthermore, consideration of climate could be incorporated into standard assessments for the reduction of conflict risk through conflict mediation, peacekeeping operations and post-conflict aid and reconstruction efforts. Climateconflict linkages could be reduced by addressing environmental challenges in building cooperation and peace or by preventing relapse into conflict in societies with especially high vulnerability and exposure to climatic hazards 40 . However, there is a need to increase our understanding of both the effectiveness and the potential adverse side effects of different actions (Supplementary Table 3 ). Trade-offs include the ways in which climate responses can create new problems or unintended consequences, which can potentially affect conflict risk 2 . For example, actions that are adaptive from one perspective-such as food export bans following climate-related crop failures-can increase instability elsewhere. Adaptation policies that favour some groups over others or that displace climatic hazards to more vulnerable groups could also affect conflict risk. Limitations in reducing conflict in general will also apply to climate-conflict linkages, such as challenges in predicting the onset and severity of conflict or in addressing the root causes of exclusion and unequal access to services and markets. Effective management of the risks will benefit from improved evidence and approaches that are suitable for deeper, difficult-to-quantify uncertainties.
Analytical challenges
Challenges in analysis strongly contribute to the key uncertainties that were identified in this assessment, especially the relative importance of climate as a driver of conflict, the mechanisms through which climate affects conflict, the conditions under which they materialize and the implications of future climate change for conflict risk (Supplementary Table 4 ).
Tight causal inferences remain unclear for many fundamental questions of interest for our understanding of why conflict occurs, including what distinguishes countries with conflict onset versus its mostcommon absence, and how particular cases can be understood in the context of broader patterns (Supplementary Table 4 ). Model design and interpretation of reported results are limited accordingly (for example, see the sections on model design, the garden of forking paths and the file drawer in Supplementary Table 4 ). Causal inference is more feasible for temperature variability compared to slow-trending variables such as levels of socioeconomic development, state capability or intergroup inequality. This limits our understanding of the relative importance of climate for conflict, the mechanisms and mediators of the effects of climate on conflict and the interactions of climate with other conflict drivers (for example, the degree to which climate modulates the timing of conflict versus increasing the overall number of conflicts that occur). Compared to studies on the outbreak of war, the climate and conflict literature has been less focused on theory and mechanisms of effects (such as through process tracing and the examination of case studies) for the generation of hypotheses for subsequent systematic testing.
Relationships between conflict drivers and outcomes tend to be temporally bounded and place-dependent 41 (Supplementary Table 4 ).
As is also the case for general conflict studies, most of the empirical evaluations to date have examined climate-conflict linkages since 1945, a period in which organized armed conflict has predominantly occurred in unique conditions that have resulted from the breakdown of colonial empires and the rise of independent states. Most previous empirical analyses have focused on contexts in which climate variability has led to conflict, rather than resilient, cooperative and peaceful outcomes that are evident in ethnographic studies. Analysing the effects of climate variability through such approaches leads to multiple uncertainties about implications for the future. Future climate-conflict linkages will involve climate variability, mean climate change and diverse effects resulting from climate change, even though empirical investigations have focused largely on climate variability (for example, temperature or precipitation variability). Open questions pertain to the ways in which climate affects distinct phases of conflict-ranging from its onset and escalation through to termination. The future will entail societal adjustments to new climate baselines, potential limits to such adaptation and thresholds in the effects of climate change for which historical precedents do not currently exist. The implications for conflict will be modulated by state systems and the policies of major powers, which will also be influenced in uncertain ways by climate change.
Conclusion
The aim of this Analysis has been to generate a comprehensive and balanced assessment of the relationship between climate and conflict risks, reconciling contradictory findings in comparative and empirical research. On the basis of the methods that were applied here, we conclude that there is agreement that climate variability and change shape the risk of organized armed conflict within countries. In conflicts to date, however, the role of climate is judged to be small compared to other drivers of conflict, and the mechanisms by which climate affects conflict are uncertain. As risks grow under future climate change, many more potential climate-conflict linkages become relevant and extend beyond historical experiences.
One could ask what the usefulness of resolving the scientific disagreement and identifying areas of agreement is. For those scholars and policy-makers who are focused on climate, a synoptic understanding of the climate-conflict relationship is important, even if the role of climate is relatively minor compared to other drivers of conflict. Given that conflict has pervasive detrimental human, economic and environmental consequences, climate-conflict linkages-even if small-would markedly influence the social costs of carbon and decisions to limit future climate change. For those scholars and policy-makers focused on conflict, the assessment has pointed to the different ways in which climate may interact with the major drivers of conflict risk. Effectively managing such interactions will require mainstream and holistic, rather than myopic, considerations of the role of the climate across diverse settings and attention to uncertainties that will persist. And finally, appreciation of the future role of climate change and its security effects can help to prioritize societal responses, which could include enhanced global aid and cooperation.
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MEthodS
The structure of the expert assessment. The expert assessment combined 3 primary phases: (1) in-depth, full-day expert-elicitation interviews, conducted individually with each member of an 11-person climate and conflict expert group; (2) an in-person, 2-day deliberation of the expert group on the interview results and associated extensions; and (3) development of a synthesis manuscript coauthored by everyone in the expert group. The author team of this manuscript consists of the climate and conflict expert group (W.N.A., H.B., M.B., J.D.F., C.S.H., J.-F.M., J.O., P.R., J.S., K.A.S. and N.v.U.) and the assessment facilitators (K.J.M., C.M.K. and C.B.F.). Stanford University IRB reviewed and approved the involvement of human subjects in this research project, including associated procedures for informed consent.
Each of the expert-assessment phases has substantial precedence in the applied-decision-sciences and assessment literature 29, 37 . For decades, combination of the three phases has been recommended [30] [31] [32] , but not yet attempted, to reduce biases that arise in expert-panel assessment (second and third phases) without sufficient attention to the range of individual perspectives on the literature and its uncertainties (first phase).
The assessment facilitators identified the expert group through extensive literature searches for publications on climate and conflict and additional suggestions from H.B., M.B., J.D.F. and K.A.S. for general conflict scholars. For each potential expert (around 65 in total), the facilitators determined disciplinary background, affiliation, published work and associated metrics, collaborators, relative emphasis on comparative and crosscutting analyses, including replicable quantitative empirical research, previous conclusions about climate and conflict, and relative focus on climate versus conflict. From this evaluation, 12 experts were identified based on a goal of spanning a wide range of relevant perspectives, consistent with expertelicitation best practices. In particular, the experts were selected to encompass a wide range of relevant disciplines (especially political science, economics, geography and environmental sciences), career stages and institutions, beliefs about the strengths of connections between climate and conflict, and relative focus on climate versus conflict. Of the identified experts, 11 accepted the invitation to participate in the project, forming the expert group. Expert elicitation. Expert elicitation is a well-vetted interview method from the applied decision and policy-analysis sciences 29 . The interview approach documents the subjective probabilistic judgments of experts, using question formats that minimize cognitive biases and overconfidence. Associated practices include exploring thinking first about more extreme possibilities compared to anchoring on initial best guesses; applying backwards analysis in which an expert considers and explains how he or she could be incorrect; and specifically challenging experts to evaluate the literature and interpretations of other experts in cases in which there are disagreements.
The interview approach also involves extended exploration of the bases of expert judgments in available evidence, along with the strengths and limitations of that evidence. For this expert assessment of climate and conflict, relevant forms of evidence include empirical observations and datasets, case-based analyses, statistical analyses, theory and its testing, simulation and descriptive models and experimental results. These forms of evidence, published in peer-reviewed literature, draw from different disciplinary approaches and methods of research.
To develop a wide-ranging understanding of societal questions relevant to evidence on climate and conflict, the assessment facilitators also conducted short, semi-structured interviews with a range of purposively sampled stakeholders who work on conflict risk reduction or climate change adaptation across professional and geographical contexts (project data 1)
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. Perspectives from these stakeholder interviews informed, in particular, the semi-structured question follow-ups during the individual expert-elicitation interviews.
The individual expert-elicitation protocol for this assessment characterized expert judgments on the evidence across four progressive themes: (1) the relative importance of causal factors increasing conflict risk; (2) the relationship between climate and conflict risk to date; (3) the relationship between climate and conflict risk in the future; and (4) the implications for climate change adaptation and conflict risk reduction.
The assessment facilitators drafted the individual expert-elicitation interview protocol. Each member of the expert group individually reviewed the clarity and effectiveness of the draft protocol. These reviews especially considered questions that are most important for evaluating the state of knowledge of the topic and reasons for disagreement across lines of evidence. The assessment facilitators, in turn, revised the expert-elicitation interview protocol, the expert group reviewed it a second time, and on that basis, the assessment facilitators prepared a final version of the interview protocol, along with implementation notes. In parallel, the assessment facilitators tested the interview protocol with two advanced graduate students who were researching climate and conflict. See methods files 1 and 2 of the project 42 for the final individual expert-elicitation interview protocol and associated response sheet.
To support the expert-elicitation interviews, the assessment facilitators developed a briefing book of relevant literature, including suggestions from the expert group (methods file 3) 42 . The goal of the briefing book was to ensure that expert judgments about the state of knowledge, as documented in the interviews, were thoroughly built from a full range of available evidence. The experts individually reviewed the briefing book in advance of the expert-elicitation interviews.
Each expert-elicitation interview was administered over 6-8 h by K.J.M., assisted by C.M.K., at the home institution of the expert. On the basis of audio recordings, transcripts were prepared by C.M.K. for each interview (constituting 787 pages in total) and then summarized anonymously by K.J.M. with each expert randomly assigned an identifying number (project data 2) 42 . Per the Stanford University IRB approval for this project and associated informed consent of the participating experts, the anonymized transcript summary is provided in project data 2 42 , however, the raw transcripts themselves are not included. Group deliberation. The second stage of the assessment was the in-person, two-day deliberation of the full expert group. Its design was based on best practices for strategically exploring perspectives 37, 43 . In particular, the deliberation combined full-group discussions, small-group discussions and individual reflections preceding those discussions. The biggest areas of disagreement and most wide-open questions were considered through different modes of interaction, in addition to the discussions: short stage-setting perspectives expanding thinking on the full range of possibilities; construction of conceptual graphics to reveal understanding of the experts' mental models; and development of the summary text. The deliberation was moderated by K.J.M.
The assessment facilitators drafted the group-deliberation agenda in advance of the meeting, with revision following the individual review of the agenda by the expert group (for the final agenda and associated individual workbook, see methods files 4 and 5 42 ). On the basis of audio recordings of the group deliberation, transcripts were again prepared (constituting 163 pages in total), with points raised then combined anonymously with the analysis of the individual expert-elicitation interviews (project data 2 42 ). After the group deliberation, each expert revisited his or her judgments from the individual expert elicitation, updating them in some cases. Synthesis manuscript. The summarized transcripts from the individual expert-elicitation interviews and group deliberation were analysed by K.J.M. through qualitative content analysis. Unique points raised were coded across the assessment themes. Commonalities and differences in expert perspectives were identified iteratively and inductively through multiple rounds of synthesis. Throughout the resulting summary, each expert is consistently identified with his or her randomly assigned number, and group deliberation inputs are referenced as 'GD' .
The nature of the corresponding traceable accounts-the linkages from expert judgments to their basis in the underlying evidence-was evaluated. Degree-of-certainty descriptors 37 were applied accordingly to characterize existing evidence (limited to robust) and agreement about the evidence (low to high). This approach draws from guidance developed for and applied by lead authors in assessments by the IPCC, as well as from analysis of the IPCC reports 35 . Data were analysed in Microsoft Excel and RStudio. In plots of subjective probabilistic judgments elicited, the randomly assigned identifying number of each expert is used. For questions about historical and future conflict risk, as well as most influential causal factors, measures of sensitivity and the increase/decrease ratio, related to climate, are defined in the analysis of judgments made. Sensitivity is (I + D)/T. Here, I is the sum of probabilities assigned to the moderate and substantial increase categories for relevant elicitation questions. D is the sum of probabilities assigned to the moderate and substantial decrease categories. T is the total probability assigned across the substantial, moderate and negligible change categories. The increase/decrease ratio is I/(D + I). An increase-decrease value of 1 indicates weighting of the moderate and substantial increase categories, but not the decrease categories. An increase-decrease value of 0.5 indicates equal weighting of the increase and decrease categories.
This analysis synthesized the 950 pages of interview and group-deliberation transcripts, along with the subjective probabilistic judgments documented, into a first draft of this manuscript. The full expert group then commented heavily on the draft through multiple rounds of revision. Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this paper.
Data availability
All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article (and its Supplementary Information) or are available in the Stanford Digital Repository (https://purl.stanford.edu/sy632nx6578) 42 . The Stanford University IRB approved involvement of the human subjects in this research project. Per that AnAlysis REsEARCH approval and associated informed consent, anonymized transcript summaries are provided, but not the raw transcripts themselves. Numbers indicate the expert identifier for each data point. A comparison of blue to orange to red data points indicates that they shift to the right and upwards. This shift illustrates the overall judgment that, with intensifying climate change, climate is expected to increasingly affect conflict risk (illustrated by greater sensitivity-that is, the upward shift). Additionally, this effect will increasingly serve to intensify rather than diminish conflict risk (illustrated by the greater increase/decrease ratio-that is, the shift to the right). For full definitions of the climate sensitivity and increase/ decrease ratio measures, see Methods.
Extended Data Fig. 6 | Expert judgments regarding the climate sensitivity and increase/decrease ratio of the most influential conflict drivers. Two measures are used to characterize elicited judgments about the relationship between factors that drive conflict risk and climate in experiences to date: climate sensitivity and increase/decrease ratio. a, Sensitivity and increase/decrease ratio are shown for each causal factor (mean across experts; causal factor abbreviations as in Extended Data  Fig. 2) . The size of each data point indicates the number of experts who ranked the causal factor in their top-six-factor list. b, c, Mean sensitivity and increase/decrease ratio are repeated for each factor from a, shown as circles. For each factor, the range indicates the maximum and minimum sensitivity (b) and increase/decrease ratio (c) across the 11 experts. a, c, For causal factors with 100% estimated for negligible change (sensitivity = 0), the increase/decrease ratio is assigned a value of 0.5. b and c are repeated from Fig. 3 , but with different sorting of factors, to enable comparison with a. For full definitions of the climate sensitivity and increase-decrease measures, see the legend of Fig. 3 and Methods.
